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The social welfare gain and investment return are two main concerns of a road investment 
project, and they are usually key components of a Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract. 
Therefore, the Pareto efficient outcomes of the two objectives are attractive for both government 
and private investor. This paper proposes a ex-post toll adjustment procedure called Pareto-
improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP), in order to achieve the Pareto efficient outcomes 
for a BOT toll road project with pre-determined road capacity and unknown demand function. 
The PI-TEP is novel and Pareto-improving, since the procedure does not require an analytical 
demand function and can improve social welfare and revenue simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
PI-TEP is theoretically proved to be efficient in obtaining the Pareto efficient outcomes. And thus, 
the procedure is practically useful and valuable for both government and private investor in a 
BOT toll road project.  
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1. Introduction 
It has long been recognized that incorporating congestion costs into road prices is essential to an 
efficient use of road since road use has negative congestion externality (Knight, 1924; Pigou, 1920; 
Walters, 1961). To internalize the congestion externality and thereby maximize social welfare, the 
classic marginal cost pricing principle states that road users of congestion roads should pay a toll 
equal to the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost (Small and 
Verhoef, 2007; Lindsey, 2006). A large number of studies have been conducted during the last 
several decades to determine and identify the optimal toll scheme in various environments (Yang 
and Huang, 2005). The Electronic Road Pricing system in Singapore and the central business 
district cordon pricing in London are two typical and successful examples of road pricing for 
mitigating road congestion. 
Besides mitigating congestion, another purpose of road pricing is to collect toll revenue for road 
financing. Traditionally, large transportation infrastructure projects used to be funded primarily 
by governments. Therefore, there have been a number of studies looking at the linkage between 
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the optimal congestion charge and road capacity investment strategy in the sense of maximizing 
total social welfare. In this situation, the public planner sets a user fee equal to the congestion 
externality. And, at the optimal capacity level, the ratio of the revenue from the congestion 
charge to the cost incurred for capacity equals the elasticity of construction cost with respect to 
capacity. The ratio is the degree of self-financing (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Verhoef and 
Mohring, 2009). The special case with constant scale economics (the elasticity is equal to one) is 
the exact self-financing theorem. Namely, under some conditions, the revenue from optimal 
congestion pricing based on the marginal cost pricing principle is sufficient to finance the fixed 
costs associated with the optimal capacity supply. There will be a deficit when there are 
economies of scale in capacity construction (the elasticity is less than one), and a surplus with dis-
economies (the elasticity is larger than one). Those results have been investigated in various 
ways, including two-mode competition in the road (Henderson, 1985), incorporating damage of 
vehicles on the road (Newbery, 1988), the effect of a general transportation network (Yang and 
Meng, 2002) and user heterogeneity in their value of time (Arnott and Kraus, 1998). 
A burgeoning literature is emerging in the road pricing area on efficiency of the private roads, 
motivated by global interests in road franchising (Engle et al., 1997). Apart from the development 
of the theory, the participation of the private firms in the road system is increasingly apparent in 
reality. In China, the toll roads are classified into the for-profit toll roads and the government 
load repayment toll roads. The highway systems in Beijing, Chongqing and Guizhou mainly 
consist of the for-profit toll roads. For those for-profit toll roads, the investors construct the road, 
operate and collect the toll revenue during their concession period (typically, 30 years) and then 
transfer the ownership of the roads to the government after the concession period via a build-
operate-transfer (BOT) contract. The toll charge level, road capacity and duration of concession 
period are three key decision variables for the BOT contract between the investors and the local 
government, which jointly determine the social welfare gain and the return of investors. Guo and 
Yang (2009) and Tan et al. (2010) studied the optimal selection of the three variables for the BOT 
toll road contract under the assumption with deterministic traffic demand.  
However, the information of traffic demand is hard to be acquired in reality. One of natural 
methods is to assume that the realized traffic demand is a random variable. Engle et al. (2001) 
proposed the least-present-value-of-revenue auction mechanism to select the optimal 
concessionaire. For any realized traffic demand level, the planner can obtain the optimal social 
welfare gain with flexible concession period. In their flexible concession-period contract, the road 
capacity is large enough and the road congestion is neglected, and thus, the road construction 
cost is pre-determined and fixed. Furthermore, the risk of the ex-post traffic demand is 
completely burdened by the government, which reduces the cost-cutting incentive of the private 
investors. To overcome the above two weaknesses, Tan and Yang (2012) proposed the partially 
flexible BOT contract by allowing the risk-sharing of the ex-post traffic demand and Pareto-
improving ex-post toll adjustment. Niu and Zhang (2013) studied the similar problem as Tan and 
Yang (2012) using a stochastic bi-objective programing model.  
For the BOT toll road project, the determination of the toll level is still one of the most challenge 
things because the exact demand function or probability distribution of the random demand level 
is hard obtained even after the toll road is built and operated for several years in reality. To solve 
the practical difficulty of demand side on decision-making and implement the socially optimal 
link toll scheme, Li (1999, 2002) made a notable progress in exploring the conceptual proposal 
and demonstrated that the exact knowledge of the demand function is not really necessary for the 
implementation of congestion pricing. What is required for the congestion toll estimation is that it 
can be derived from the engineering-based speed–flow relationship and an accurate estimation of 
the value of travel time savings. Li (2002) proposed an iterative procedure in deriving the 
‘‘optimal’’ congestion toll in the absence of demand function and applied the procedure to 
estimate the congestion toll by using directly the commonly available traffic count data for the 
area-licensing scheme and major expressways in Singapore. Yang et al. (2004) extended the 
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iterative procedure proposed by Li (2002) and proved the convergent properties rigorously to a 
general network in presence of the demand function. Note that, the convergence of the trial-and-
error procedure proposed by Li (2002) cannot be guaranteed by the bi-section method under 
certain conditions. Wang and Yang (2012) modified the procedure and proved its convergence 
under general conditions. 
It must be pointed out that, the trial-and-error procedure (Li, 2002; Wang and Yang, 2012) is 
proposed to implement the social optimal toll scheme to maximize the total social welfare. 
However, for a toll road project with the franchising scheme, the toll revenue is an important 
economic index besides the social welfare. The toll revenue can be used to cover the toll road 
construction investment and future the operation & maintenance cost. Specially, for a BOT toll 
road project, a private sector builds a public road and collects the user fees to recover his/her 
investment returns by setting a long-term contract with the government (Nombela and de Rus, 
2004; Guo and Yang, 2009, Tan et al., 2010; Tan and Yang, 2012). In this case, the toll adjustment 
procedure should not reduce the interests of both public and private sectors. Therefore, the trial-
and-error procedure aiming to achieve the socially optimal toll level generally cannot be accepted 
by the private firm.  
We focus our discussion on the ex post toll adjustment procedure which is Pareto-improving in 
both social surplus and toll revenue with predetermined road capacity and unknown analytical 
demand function. The toll adjustment procedure is a revised version of the trial-and-error 
procedure proposed by Li (2002) and called Pareto-improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP). 
We will prove that the procedure is efficient to achieve one of Pareto optimal outcomes in the 
sense of the social surplus and toll revenue. And thus, the PI-TEP is self-renewal and practically 
useful. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section first proposes the basic 
problem and its mathematical model. The PI-TEP is introduced and the theoretical proof of its 
convergence is given in Section 3. A numerical example to depict the efficiency of the procedure 
is described in Section 4 and conclusions together with recommendations for future research are 
given in Section 5. 
2. The problem 
The outcomes of the social welfare gain and investment return, related to the road users and the 
private investor, respectively, are mainly concerned for a private toll road project, specially, 
through a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract. Generally, the concession period, the road 
capacity and toll charge in a BOT contract jointly determine the outcomes. However, the exact 
demand curve or customer’s willing-to-pay function is unknown even after the highway is built. 
In this paper, we assume that the highway is built and the concession period and road capacity is 
given. The objective of the government and the private firm is to achieve the Pareto optimal 
outcomes in the sense of the social welfare and revenue by the ex post toll adjustment procedure 
without the information of the traffic demand function.  
Consider a single BOT toll road project connecting two cities. Let B(q) be the willing-to-pay 
function or inverse demand function, which is unknown to both government and private firm, 
where q is the travel demand. Denote t(q) as the link travel time function. For any given toll 
charge p, the demand q is assumed to be determined by the following demand-supply 
equilibrium condition  
    B q p t q           (1) 
where β is the value-of-time to convert time cost unit into equivalent monetary cost unit (we 
consider homogeneous users only). We assume that the operation and maintenance cost is 
normalized to zero.  
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Given the toll charge, p, the unit-time (each year for example) social surplus of the highway 
project is the sum of the consumer’s surplus and the operator’s surplus, namely, 
      CSS q q R q  .        (2) 
In eqn. (2), the traffic demand q is determined by demand-supply equilibrium (1) for given toll p; 
CS is the unit-time consumers’ surplus and R is the unit-time toll revenue, which can be 
calculated as: 
           
0 0
CS d d
q q
q B w w q p t q B w w qB q          (3) 
and 
       R q qp q B q t q   .       (4) 
Substitute (3) and (4) into (2), the unit-time social surplus can be calculated as 
      
0
d
q
S q B w w qt q  .        (5) 
The social surplus and the toll revenue are two important outcomes for the highway project. We 
consider the following bi-objective problem which results in the Pareto optimal outcomes in the 
sense of the social surplus and toll revenue, 
 
 
 0maxp
S q
R q
   
.          (6) 
The following assumption is made on B(q), t(q)throughout the paper. 
 
Assumption 1.  
a. The inverse demand function B(q) is strictly decreasing and differentiable in q; qB(q) is strictly 
concave in q. 
b. The link travel time function t(q) is a convex and increasing function of link flow q. 
 
Since qB(q) is strictly concave and t(q) is increasing and convex in q, we know that the revenue 
function given by (4) is the difference between one concave and convex functions, and thus 
concave in demand q. In addition, from the definition of social surplus (5) and the inverse 
demand function B(q) is strictly decreasing, we know that ∂2S/∂q2 <0 by direct calibration. 
Therefore, Assumption 1 guarantees the concavities of the functions of both toll revenue and 
social surplus, given by (4) and (5), respectively. It must be pointed out that, Assumption 1 is not 
restrictive, the commonly used linear, negative exponential and power demand functions all 
satisfy Assumption 1 (a) and the BPR (Bureau Public Roads) link travel time function is clearly 
convex and increasing in q. 
Additionally, we assume that limq⟶0B(q)>βt(0)  which means that the maximal potential benefit is 
larger than the free-flow travel cost of the road. The assumption follows the common sense that a 
newly built road surely attracts users. Under the assumption, it is clear to know that the set of the 
feasible solutions of the problem (6) is not empty. 
For the case with deterministic and fixed demand function B(q), Tan et al. (2010) investigated the 
Pareto optimal contract including the selection of road capacity, toll charge and concession 
period. When the demand function has a known structure but unknown parameters, Tan and 
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Yang (2012) proposed the postponement strategy to determine the optimal contract. The 
postponement strategy assumes the demand function can be ex-post observed and the contract 
adjustment follows a two-period decision procedure. Moreover, the parameter learning method, 
such as Bayesian learning approach, can be adopted to analyze the multi-period contract 
adjustment (Besbes and Zeevi, 2009). However, in many practical applications, the structure of 
the exact demand function is also unknown and hard to be estimated even using enough 
historical data and the advanced traffic demand management technologies. Therefore, the Pareto 
optimal outcomes are desirable, which cannot be obtained by solving the bi-objective 
programming problem (6) without the analytical demand function. 
Many previous studies focus on how to implement the marginal-cost pricing to derive the 
socially optimal link flow. That is to say, they simplified the problem to achieve the polar 
solution of problem (6) by considering just one objective or maximizing the social surplus. In this 
case, the trial-and-error method proposed by Li (2002) is enough and efficient to obtain the 
socially optimal toll charge level. Therefore, the method is useful for a public toll road. However, 
for a BOT toll road project, the road is operated by the private firm through a contract with the 
government. The toll adjustment procedure should consider the interests of both government 
and private firm. And thus, the trial-and-error method aiming to obtain the socially optimal toll 
charge cannot be applied directly in such a toll road project. We focus our discussion on the ex 
post toll adjustment provision which is Pareto-improving for both social surplus and toll revenue 
with unknown demand function. The toll adjustment procedure is self-renewal and practically 
acceptable to both government and the private firm.  
3. Pareto-improving toll adjustment provision 
In this section, we first review the trial-and-error procedure proposed by Li (2002) for a single 
link. The traditional trial-and-error procedure tends to achieve the socially optimal toll scheme 
for a congestible highway without exact travel demand information. We call the procedure as 
socially optimal trial-and-error procedure (SO-TEP). Correspondingly, we define our trial-and-
error procedure to achieve the Pareto efficient outcomes in the sense of the social surplus and toll 
revenue as the Pareto-improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP).  
The iterative SO-TEP works as follows: start with an initial targeted flow to achieve by imposing 
a corresponding congestion toll. We now adopt the modified bi-section method proposed by 
Wang and Yang (2012) to describe the trial-and-error procedure for our late reference. For the SO-
TEP, the initial target domain is set to be 0 0,L Rq q   , where 0 0Lq   and 0 UERq q  is the user 
optimal demand level without toll. It is clear to see that 0 0,L Rq q q    . Suppose any initial target 
link flow 0 01 ,L Rq q q    . To achieve the target link flow 1q , imposing toll charge 1p  determined 
by 
  p qt q            (7) 
with 1q q . Then the observed demand becomes 1qˆ , which is an aggregate result of the user’s 
willing-to-pay. Now, the initial target domain can be updated to 1 1,L Rq q   , where 
  1 0 1 1ˆmax ,min ,L Lq q q q  and   1 0 1 1ˆmin ,max ,R Rq q q q . Two conclusions can be obtained 
immediately from the trial-and-error iteration: 1 1,L Rq q q     since 
   1 1 1 1ˆ ˆmin , , max ,q q q q q   ; the length of the initial domain is surely reduced (Wang and 
Yang, 2012).  
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Now, let  1 12 2L Rq q q   and estimate the toll charge using eqn. (7) with 2q q . When the new 
toll charge is imposed, the traffic demand on the highway is observed and denoted as 2qˆ . 
Similarly, the target domain is now updated to 2 2,L Rq q    using the method as described above. 
We now depict the SO-TEP as follows. 
The socially optimal trial-and-error procedure (SO-TEP) (Wang and Yang, 2012): 
Step 0: (initialization) Set the initial search domain 0 0,L Rq q    with 0 0Lq   and 0 UERq q , 
1n  . 
Step 1: (impose toll and observe flow) Impose a toll  n n nq t q   , where 
 1 1 2n nn L Rq q q    and observe a revealed traffic flow ˆnq . 
Step 3: (check convergence) If ˆn n nq q q   , where   is a sufficiently small number, 
then stop. Otherwise, go to Step 3. 
Step 4: (update target flow) Let 
  1 ˆmax ,min ,n nL L n nq q q q                                                                                         (8) 
   1 ˆmin , max ,n nR R n nq q q q                                                                                        (9) 
Set a new target flow  1 11 2n nn L Rq q q    , and : 1n n  . Go to Step 1. 
Based on the SO-TEP, we obtain a series of closed nested intervals  
1
,n nn L R nq q


      with 
following properties: 
 1n n             (10) 
 1 2n n             (11) 
and 
 , 1nq n   .         (12) 
From the nested interval theorem, we know that the series of observed demand derived from the 
trial-and-error procedure converges to the socially optimal level as n  approaches infinity, and 
thus, the toll charge sequence converges to the socially optimal level. The rigorous proof can be 
found in Wang and Yang (2012). 
As we have mentioned, the SO-TEP aims to achieve the socially optimal toll level. If the toll road 
is built and operated via a franchising scheme, namely, the private firm manages the toll road. 
Both social welfare gain and investment return are concerned. In this case, the SO-TEP is hard to 
be accepted by the private firm, who cares about the toll revenue after the road is built. With such 
a consideration, we now propose our Pareto-improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP) to 
adjust the toll charge and guarantee the Pareto-improving outcomes in the sense of the social 
surplus and the toll revenue.  
We first investigate the condition under which the Pareto improvement does exist. Given an 
original charge 0p  of the toll road, the realized demand is denoted as 0q , and the corresponding 
congestion externality is  0 0q t q . Let q  be the socially optimal demand level at the 
predetermined capacity level. If the following condition is satisfied: 
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  0 0 0p q t q  ,         (13) 
then we must have 0q q  . Otherwise, if 0q q  , we get 
 
   
     
      
   
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0
         
         
          
q q B q B q
p t q qt q t q
p qt q t q t q
p qt q q t q
  
    
     
     
 
  
  
 
      (14) 
which contradicts assumption (13). The last two inequalities follow from that the increasing 
monotonicity of the link travel time function and 0q q  . Furthermore, under Assumption 1, 
both social surplus  S q  and revenue  R q  are strictly decreasing in q  when q q   or 
increasing in p  when  p qt q    . Condition (13) implies that if the toll is set too low at the 
predetermined capacity level, a proper increase in toll would improve both the social surplus and 
revenue. 
On the other hand, if the toll is set too high, the Pareto improvement would also exist. Denote q  
as the monopoly optimal demand level at the predetermined capacity level, and the 
corresponding monopoly toll is p . In viewing p  as the function of q , and taking the derivation 
of revenue  R q  in p , we know that, if q q , then 
 
   00
0
0 1 0
q
p
q q
R q
q E
p 
            (15) 
where  0
0 0 0
0 0,
d dqp q q p pE q p p q   is the price elasticity of demand and demand q  is 
determined by eqn. (1) at 0p p  and 0q q . The last inequality follows from the concavity of 
 R q  in q  and q q  since q  maximizes revenue  R q . Condition (15) simply means that the 
original toll is set too high and located at the elasticity domain of demand on price or 0
0
1qpE   . 
The following proposition shows the conditions of guaranteeing the existence of the Pareto 
improvement. 
 
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, for any given original toll charge 0p , if the realized demand 0q  
satisfies condition (13) or (15), then there exists a Pareto-improving  trial-and-error procedure increasing 
both social surplus and toll revenue of the road. 
 
Proof. Let  q  and q  denote the revenue-maximizing and socially optimal demand levels, which 
maximize the toll revenue R  and social surplus S , respectively. It is clear to see that the original 
demand level 0q q  if condition (15) holds, and 0q q   if condition (13) holds since both 
revenue R  and social surplus S , given by (4) and (5), respectively, are strictly concave. 
Furthermore, from the relation between the social surplus and toll revenue 
         0 dqS q R q B qB q    ,      (16) 
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we know that 
 
        d d
d d
S q R q
qB q
q q
   .       (17) 
And thus, according to eqn. (17), at q q , we know 
 
          
0 0
0 0 0 0
d d
0
d d
q q q q
S q R q
q B q q B q
q q 
       ,   (18) 
which implies that q q  . We now know that, both revenue R  and social surplus S  are strictly 
increasing with respect to q  in domain  0,q ;  both revenue R  and social surplus S  are strictly 
decreasing with respect to q  in domain  ,q  ; revenue R  decreases while social surplus S  
increases as q  increases in domain  ,q q . Therefore, since condition (13) implies 0q q  , we 
know that decreasing q  or, equivalently, increasing link toll p  results in the increasing of both 
social surplus and revenue. Similarly, since condition (15) implies 0q q , we know that 
increasing q  or, equivalently, decreasing link toll p  results in the increasing of both the social 
welfare and revenue. The proof is completed. □ 
Proposition 1 depicts two cases, in which the toll adjustment can improve both social surplus and 
toll revenue: condition (13) holds or the original toll charge is too low, increasing toll will 
improve both social surplus and revenue; while condition (15) holds or the original toll charge is 
too high, both social surplus and revenue can be improved by decreasing the toll charge. Under 
the conditions described in Proposition 1, there is an incentive for both government and private 
firm to adjust the original toll charge.  
We now move to depict our Pareto-improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP). Denote 0p  
and 0q  as the initial toll charge and the corresponding demand level. The initial unit-time toll 
revenue can be calculated with eqn. (4) as 0 0 0R p q , while the initial unit-time social surplus 0S  
cannot be obtained since the demand function is unknown. The PI-TEP to achieve one of the 
Pareto optimal outcomes is given below. 
The Pareto-improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP): 
Step 0: Set 0n  , and calibrate the initial revenue n n nR p q  according to the initial toll 
charge np  and corresponding demand level nq . 
Step 1: If condition  n n np q t q   holds, then set the initial searching interval 
 , 0,n nL R nq q q     and conduct SO-TEP to achieve the socially optimal toll 
scheme p . Otherwise, go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Impose a toll  ˆn n np q t q  , observe a revealed traffic flow ˆnq , and calculate 
the current revenue ˆ ˆ ˆn n nR p q . If ˆn nR R , then set the initial searching interval 
 ˆ, 0,n nL R nq q q     and conduct SO-TEP to achieve the socially optimal toll 
scheme p  by setting the initial searching interval as  ˆ, ,n nL R n nq q q q    . 
Otherwise, go to Step 3. 
EJTIR 14(1), 2014, pp.66-81  74 
Tan and Tan 
Pareto-improving toll adjustment for a build-operate-transfer toll road project with unknown demand  
 
Step 3: Update the link toll to  1 ˆ 2n n np p p   , observe a revealed traffic flow 1nq  , 
and calculate the current revenue 1 1 1n n nR p q   .  
Step 4: If 1n np p    , where   is a sufficiently small number, then stop. Otherwise 
go to Step 5.  
Step 5: If 1n nR R  , then set 1ˆ :n np p   and go to Step 3; 
If 1n nR R   and  1 1 1n n np q t q    , then set  1 1 1, ,n nL R n nq q q q       and 
conduct SO-TEP to achieve the socially optimal toll scheme p ;  
If 1n nR R   and  1 1 1n n np q t q    , then set : 1n n  , 1:n np p  , 1:n nq q  , 
1:n nR R   and go to Step 2. 
The contract adjustment is inescapable after a highway project is built because of the lack of the 
exact demand information. The renegotiation between the government and the private firm is 
suggested. However, the renegotiation is expensive because of negotiation cost and the 
discrepancy on the ex post contract adjustment between the government and the private firm is 
hard to be resolved (Athias and Saussier, 2007). It is in the dilemma for the both parties between 
doing nothing on the ex ante contract and renegotiation (Crocker and Masten, 1991; Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001). Our PI-TEP aims to achieve one of the Pareto optimal outcomes in the sense of the 
social surplus and toll revenue. In fact, the realized traffic demand resulted by the procedure is 
one of Pareto optimal solutions of problem (6). Furthermore the procedure is Pareto-improving, 
namely, it does not reduce the initial levels of the social surplus and toll revenue. Therefore, the 
adjustment can be accepted by both parties. We now move to prove the above conclusions, which 
are summarized into the following proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. The PI-TEP is Pareto-improving and the realized demand resulted by the procedure 
converges to one of the Pareto optimal solutions of problem (6). 
 
Proof. It is clear to see that, at any iteration n , three cases occur:  0,nq q ,  ,nq q q   and 
 ,nq q  . The corresponding toll charge and revenue are denoted as np  and nR , 
respectively. According to the proof of Proposition 1, we know that inequality  n n np q t q   
holds is  ,nq q  . The SO-TEP achieves the socially optimal link toll, which strictly 
dominates the initial toll scheme np  since both social welfare and revenue are higher at p  than 
those at np . Now we move to consider the case with nq q  , or, equivalently,  n n np q t q   
does not hold. In this case, updating the toll charge to  ˆn n np q t q  , the realized demand 
ˆnq q  . Again, p  strictly dominates np  when ˆn nR R  since    ˆnS q S q   and 
   ˆ ˆn nR R q R q    with ˆnq q  . Now, change toll charge ˆnp  to  1 ˆ 2n n np p p    if ˆn nR R , 
we can calculate the revenue 1nR   based on the observed traffic demand 1nq  . According to the 
concavities of the revenue and social surplus, we know that 1ˆn n np p p   and 1 ˆn n nq q q  . 
Following the similar discussion, if 1n nR R   and  1 1 1n n np q t q    , then p  strictly dominates 
np . We can conduct SO-TEP to achieve socially optimal link toll p . However, if 1n nR R   but 
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 1 1 1n n np q t q     does not hold, then 1np   strictly dominates np  since both revenue and social 
surplus are surely improved. The reason for the relationship    1n nS q S q   holding is that the 
social surplus is strictly increasing in domain  0,q  and 1n nq q q    since  1 1 1n n np q t q    . 
Finally, if 1n nR R  , then there must exist one Pareto optimal solution of problem (6) dominating 
np  in domain  1,n np p  . Therefore, if nq  happens to locate in domain  ,nq q q  , then, iterating 
Step 3 to Step 5, the procedure stops at toll np ; If nq  happens to locate in domain  0,nq q , 
then, iterating Step 3 to Step 5 results in a strictly Pareto-improving toll scheme for the next 
iteration of the procedure and a Pareto optimal solution can be achieved. The proof is completed. 
□ 
Proposition 2 guarantees the convergence of the PI-TEP to a certain Pareto optimal solution of 
problem (6) for any initial toll level. The proof depends on the concavities of the revenue and 
social surplus. We now adopt the Figure 1 to graphically explain the efficiency of the PI-TEP. As 
shown in Figure 1, both social surplus function  S q  and revenue function  R q  are strictly 
concave in traffic demand q . For any initial toll charge level, the realized demand locates in one 
of the three domains:  0, MRq , ,MR MSq q    and  ,MSq  , where MRq  and MSq  are the demand 
levels that maximize the toll revenue  R q  and social surplus  S q  functions, respectively. 
Note that, the realized traffic demand should be up bounded in reality. Without loss of 
generality, we simply assume the realized traffic demand can be infinity.  
 
Figure 1. Graphical explanation of PI-TEP  
 
When the realized demand 0q  locates in  ,MSq   with the initial toll charge 0p , then condition 
(13) holds. In this case, MSq  strictly dominates 0q  and is the Pareto optimal solution of problem 
(6). And thus, we adopt SO-TEP to implement the socially optimal toll charge.  
S
R
q
MSqMRq
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When the realized demand 0q  locates in ,
MR MSq q    with the initial toll charge 0p , then 0q  is 
Pareto optimal solution of problem (6). In this case, updating the toll charge using eq. (7) with 
0q q , the observed demand level must be higher than q  and toll revenue also lower than the 
initial revenue level, since the revenue function is strictly decreasing in domain  ,MRq  , as 
shown in Figure 1. Using bi-section method, the PI-TEP must result in the Pareto solution 0q .  
The method is a little complicate when the realized demand 0q  locates in 0,
MRq    with the 
initial toll charge 0p . In this case, conducting one trial using the toll charge  0 0q t q , the 
realized demand level must be higher than q . Various scenarios will occur. If the toll revenue is 
not lower than the initial level, then the socially optimal demand q  must strictly dominate 0q . If 
the toll revenue is lower than the initial level. We can always find a demand state between 0q  
and new realized demand level strictly dominating 0q  and repeat the procedure at the new 
demand state. It is clear to see that the PI-TEP must result in one Pareto optimal solution. 
It must be pointed out that, condition (15) cannot be examined since the demand function is 
unknown. However, if the price elasticity of demand can be estimated via an external technology, 
then we can exactly determine the set of the Pareto optimal solutions. In this case, conditions (13) 
and (15) can be viewed as triggers. When either condition does not hold because of the change of 
the demand curve, then the PI-TEP can be triggered and the new Pareto optimal solution will be 
achieved. Therefore, our proposed PI-TEP is robust for the socioeconomic change. Namely, if the 
demand function or structure varies, one can make the procedure active to set a new adjustment 
scheme, which surely results in a new Pareto optimal solution based on the new demand curve. 
4. Numerical Example 
We now present a simple numerical example to elucidate the application of the proposed Pareto-
improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP) for a franchising toll road project with unknown 
demand. The numerical example has been used in Tan et al. (2010). Consider the following BPR-
type link travel time and the true demand functions 
  
4
0, 1.0 0.15
qt q y t
y
         
       (19) 
   1 ln ,   0qB q b
b Q
              (20) 
where Q  is the potential demand and b  is a scaling parameter reflecting the sensitivity of 
demand to full trip cost. We further assume that 41.0 10Q   (veh/h) and 0.04b  . The free-
flow travel time for the new highway 0 0.5t  (h). The capacity of the road is set to be 1000y   
(veh/h). The value-of-time is assumed to be 100  (HK$/h). The socially optimal and revenue-
maximization demand levels can be calculated as 779q   (veh/h) and 464q   (veh/h). The 
corresponding toll charges are 11.05p   (HK$) and 26.41p   (HK$). Therefore, it is clear to 
see that, the Pareto optimal toll charge must locate in the domain  11.05,26.41  and the realized 
demand or the set of the Pareto optimal solutions of problem (6) is  464,779 . By simple 
calibration, the social surplus and toll revenue at social optimum are, respectively, 38.61 10
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HK$ and 42.81 10 HK$. Te social surplus and toll revenue at revenue-maximization are, 
respectively, 41.23 10 HK$ and 42.39 10 HK$. 
We plot the toll charge, realized demand, the corresponding social surplus and toll revenue 
before and after the PI-TEP by varying the initial toll charge from zero to 40 HK$ with a step 0.5. 
Figure 2 shows the resulted toll charge via the PI-TEP at various initial toll charge levels. It is 
clear to see that, if the initial toll charge is lower than the socially optimal level, then the PI-TEP 
derives the socially optimal toll, which is, of course, one of the Pareto optimal tolls. The PI-TEP 
does not change the initial toll charge which happens to be the Pareto optimal, as shown in 
Figure 2. When the initial toll charge is higher than the revenue-maximization level, the resulted 
toll charge via PI-TEP is a little random which depends on the structure of demand and travel 
time functions. Notably, the resulted toll charges are also Pareto optimal. In Figures 3-5, we 
compare the initial levels of the realized demand, social surplus and toll revenue to the ones after 
the PI-TEP at each given initial toll charge. The observations are similar to those in Figure 2. From 
Figures 2-5, it is clear to see that, our proposed PI-TEP is efficient to achieve one of the Pareto 
optimal outcomes in the sense of the social surplus and toll revenue with Pareto optimal toll 
charge and traffic demand. The procedure does not resort the exact analytical demand function. 
 
Figure 2. Toll charge before and after PI-TEP 
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Figure 3. Realized demand before and after PI-TEP 
 
 
Figure 4. Realized social surplus before and after PI-TEP 
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Figure 5. Realized toll revenue before and after PI-TEP 
5. Conclusions 
For a build-operate-transfer (BOT) toll road project, which is operated by the private firm, the 
investment return and social welfare gain are two main concerns. Therefore, the Pareto efficient 
outcomes in the sense of the social surplus and toll revenue are preferred by the private firm and 
the local government when a toll road has been built. However, the exact information on traffic 
demand is hard to acquire. And thus, it is impossible to ex ante select the BOT contract which is 
associated with a Pareto optimal outcome, as done by Tan et al. (2010). This paper proposed a 
Pareto-improving trial-and-error procedure (PI-TEP) to achieve the Pareto optimal outcomes 
with unknown demand function. Our PI-TEP is a revised version of the traditional trial-and-error 
procedure, which aims to derive the socially optimal toll charge. We proved that the PI-TEP is 
convergent and can achieve one of the Pareto optimal solutions of problem (6) under certain 
common assumptions. The PI-TEP is practically useful and acceptable by the private firm and 
government since the adjustment is Pareto-improving or it does not worse the initial realized 
interest of neither party. Finally, the numerical example depicts that our PI-TEP is efficient to 
achieve the Pareto optimal outcomes without resorting the analytical demand function.  
It must be pointed out that the proposed PI-TEP is based on the ex post adjustment, namely, the 
road capacity is predetermined. One of interesting and challenging issues is that how the ex post 
PI-TEP affects the ex ante decision of road capacity for a BOT toll road project. In addition, it is 
also interesting to improve the computing efficiency of the proposed procedure and to extend the 
method to a full transportation network. 
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